You knew there were others in that building. You had no way to find them.
Have you ever wondered why you didn’t get the business?
Not the deal that died loudly, where at least you knew where you stood. The other one. The meeting went beautifully. She leaned in, asked the questions only someone who lives with the problem asks, and said the sentence you fly across an ocean to hear: this is exactly what we need. Then three weeks of quiet, and a short, kind email. We’ve decided to hold off for now.
Nothing went wrong in your meeting. You lost the deal in a conversation you never heard, argued by someone who doesn’t work for you, in front of people you never met.
You knew she was not the whole company. Everyone knows that. What you did not have was a way to find the rest, so you did what almost everyone does. You hoped she was the right one.
The short version
Knowing you need the right person is not the same as knowing who it is. Without a method you get one person arguing your case alone, against a budget committed months ago, a specification written by somebody else, and one colleague who would rather you lost. Find out early who decides, on what basis, and who loses if you win, then hand your contact the answer before the question gets asked.
Enthusiasm is not authority
The person most excited about what you do is often furthest from the money, and the person who signs may never meet you. Large American organizations spread approval on purpose, so no single enthusiast can commit the institution.
It still comes down to one person who can say yes.
The pattern, up close
I have watched this one for twenty-five years. The company changes, the sector changes, the shape does not.
A European cleantech company courts the general manager of a large publicly owned utility in the American West. Years of it. Conferences. A trip to Europe to see installations. The headquarters tour. A presentation on the benefits to his utility, through their own eyes.
Communication slows. Then it stalls. Then it stops.
They see him at a conference and ask when they can expect to move forward. He is kind about it. The utility has moved on to other priorities.
Four things have killed it, and none of them is the product.
His job is keeping the system running, not adopting new technology, even technology that would run it better. He never has the full picture in his own numbers, because nobody built it for him. In American public power the general manager runs the utility, but an appointed board approves the capital plan, and those commissioners never hear the company’s name, because he has nothing to hand them. And there is no U.S. reference, nothing that makes being the first American buyer feel survivable.
The question that reopens it
I have asked one question in that situation more times than I can count. Had they applied to the utility’s technology demonstration program?
Usually they have not. Usually nobody told them it exists.
Most large American utilities run one. Demonstration program, emerging technology group, sandbox: the name varies.
And it is not a utility thing. A studio has an accelerator. A hospital system has an innovation office. A defense prime has a ventures arm, and the Pentagon runs units whose whole job is buying from companies that have never sold to the government. The name changes by sector. The shape does not: its own budget, its own manager, and permission to fail that the operating line does not have.
Which makes the question portable. Not do you run a demonstration program, but who here is allowed to try something unproven?
That question changes four things. It finds a budget holder who is not the general manager. It puts the risk inside a program built to absorb it. It lets the general manager back new technology without putting his operating record behind it. And it gives the board something they already understand: a test, not a purchase.
Four separate failures, one root cause. Not that they thought one contact was the whole company. They knew better. They had no way to find the rest, and the door they needed was already in that building.
Three things to find out before your next follow-up
1. Map the room while people are still specific.
Ask in the first or second meeting, before enthusiasm makes everyone vague. Who else needs to agree? Whose budget does this come from? Who signs, and what must be true for them to sign without another meeting?
“The committee will review it” tells you nothing. “Dave picked the incumbent three years ago and will ask what happens when it fails at two in the morning” is something you can answer. Asking is not rude here. It reads as competence.
2. Find out who loses if you win.
There is almost always someone. The manager who chose the incumbent and would have to explain the switch. The peer whose project draws on the same capital pool. The operations lead who owns the 2 a.m. call and did not ask for a new variable in his night.
Their objection gets raised on a day you are not there to answer it. So find it now, and hand over the answer first. Most European sellers never ask it, which is why it improves the odds.
3. Find the basis, not just the people.
What the decision runs on matters more than who decides. Five things to write down this week:
- The month the capital budget closes. In American public and municipal buying, next year’s money is committed long before anyone returns your call. Arrive in month eleven and the best answer available is next cycle.
- Who writes the specification. Often an outside engineering firm, not your customer. If your technology is not in the spec, procurement cannot buy it, no matter who likes you.
- The incumbent’s renewal date. That is your window, and somebody in the building can tell you what it is.
- Who the approving body listens to. A board takes its cue from someone: a staff engineer, a consultant, a commissioner with a point of view. Get them one page before the agenda is set.
- Who is allowed to try something unproven. Every large organization has someone. That unit has its own budget and carries risk nobody else will.
Scripts you can use this week
The map question, in meeting one or two, not month three:
“Who else needs to agree, and who signs? I’d rather ask now than guess later.”
The one almost nobody asks:
“Who in the building would rather this didn’t happen, and what will they say? I’d like to hand you the answer before they raise it.”
The basis question:
“When does the money for something like this get decided, and who writes the specification it has to fit? And who here is allowed to try something unproven?”
Decision lens: what to check before your next call
- Can you name every person in that room, by title? If not, you do not have a deal. You have a friendly contact.
- Do you know the month the money gets decided, and who writes the specification?
- Who loses if you win, and does your contact have the answer to their objection in writing?
Think Slow. Act Fast. Win Big.
Think Slow. Ask the uncomfortable questions early, while people are still specific, before you spend another quarter on one relationship.
Act Fast. Ask the three questions on your next call. Not after the trade show. This week.
Win Big. The company that knows the room beats the company with the better product. Map it once and you stop selling blind in America, the first job of your first U.S. hire.
You did not lose because your product was not good enough. You lost because you had one contact and no map. That is fixable this week, with three questions.
If you cannot name the room on your largest live U.S. deal, that is the conversation. It takes thirty minutes.
Thomas Riebs, JD
Managing Partner
Traksjon
Think Slow. Act Fast. Win Big.
Los Angeles, California, USA
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